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Oil  Supply 
and  Tax  Incentives 
THE WORLD  ECONOMY  now depends almost entirely on fossil fuels for its 
energy. Even according to the most optimistic assumption of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, fossil fuels, especially oil  and natural gas, will be 
dominant sources of energy until well into the twenty-first century. The 
supplies and demands for energy are, however, intricately connected  in 
terms of both fuels and locations, so that marginal changes in one part of 
the system elicit responses in other parts, especially affecting the United 
States, which is both the largest producer and the largest consumer. The 
stress on the system in  1973 and 1974 became apparent when world oil 
prices  were raised sharply, intensifying interest in reducing U.S. dependence 
on foreign supplies. Events since then bear plain witness to this phenom- 
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enon, as well as to the profound influence that governmental policies can 
have.' 
On the supply side, a number of forces were at work. Nuclear power 
plants have not been delivered and installed on schedule, and those that 
have been installed have generally  not had the anticipated reliability. Artifi- 
cially low ceiling prices in the United  States have induced shortages of 
reserves of natural gas and held down production. 
Furthermore,  environmental  considerations have hampered the develop- 
ment of new sources of fossil fuels. They have curtailed  the drilling program 
in  the  Santa Barbara Channel; delayed the  construction  of  the  trans- 
Alaska pipeline and the drilling on the Alaskan North Slope to estimate 
its oil and gas reserves; and clouded discussions of a Mackenzie Valley 
pipeline through Canada and delayed exploratory drilling in the Canadian 
Arctic.2 
At the same time, challenges to the U.S.  Bureau of Land Management 
postponed the sale of leases and thus delayed the discovery and develop- 
ment of new oil and gas reserves in the Gulf of Mexico, while the cut from 
27.5 percent to 22 percent in the depletion allowance on oil and natural gas, 
in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, removed some part of the tax incentives for 
exploration, development, and production of domestic oil and gas. 
All of these influences were complicated and reinforced by uncertainty. 
The deliberations of the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control dis- 
turbed producers in the United States and left them uncertain about when 
and how the mandatory import control program would be relaxed; about 
the prospects for the state conservation regulations under which they were 
1. A partial  catalogue  of the factors  at work,  many of them  related  to U.S. policy,  also 
appears  in the editors'  introduction  to Edward W. Erickson  and Leonard Waverman 
(eds.), The Energy Question:  An International  Failure of Policy, Vol. 1, The World 
(Toronto:  University  of Toronto  Press, 1974).  Vol. 2 of The  Energy  Question  focuses on 
North America.  The papers  in these volumes  are the background  against  which energy 
problems  are discussed  here. 
2. Our mention of a number  of policies associated with environmental  protection 
does not mean that we believe that they are a fundamental  cause of the energy  crisis 
(although  we do not believe  that all of them are necessarily  optimal).  Such policies have 
aggravated  energy  supply  and demand  adjustment  processes  in the United States, and, 
to the extent that U.S. problems  are pivotal to the worldwide energy industry, have 
contributed  to stress elsewhere  as well. But they are at most second- or perhaps  even 
third-order  factors in the energy crisis. In our view, the nation can have enhanced 
environmental  protection-at  some cost-without  drastic  changes  in either  the level or 
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accustomed to operating; and about the landed price, source, and volume 
of foreign oil against which they would have to compete. One result was 
the interruption in U.S. refinery construction at the very time when sub- 
stantial new capacity should have been initiated. 
Pressures came from the demand side,  as  well.  Demand  accelerated 
under the impact of automobile emission controls, which depress gasoline 
mileage. Restrictions on the production and use of coal,  as well as the 
government's efforts to control end uses rather  than rely on price rationing 
as a means of allocating short supplies of natural gas, spurred demand for 
low-sulfur fuel oils; but refining capacity, more and more pinched, was 
less and less able to meet the demand. 
In some areas, demand and supply factors were inextricably entwined. 
Price controls in the United States distorted the normal economic incen- 
tives that determine the mix of refinery output, kept the price of crude oil 
below the market-clearing  level, and finally evolved into a two-tier price 
system for "old" and "new" domestic crude oil with various categories of 
exemptions and incentives that affected production decisions. 
Growth in the demand for electricity caused power companies to prolong 
the life of aging equipment, which is on average less dependable, to use 
older equipment more intensively than they would prefer, and to expand 
effective capacity with fuel-intensive internal combustion turbines. 
The supplies and demands for coal, the fuel most readily substitutable 
for oil in some uses, were both affected by controls on power plant emis- 
sions, land reclamation standards, and mine safety laws. 
Overlying these economic and policy matters, and interacting with them, 
were two significant psychological factors. One was the proclamation by 
alarmists marching to the beat of an imaginary drummer that the world 
was in imminent danger of running out of fossil fuels-this  in face of new 
oil and gas strikes in Indonesia, China, Russia, Nigeria, South America, 
the North Sea, Australia, Alaska, Canada, and elsewhere. The other was 
the unaccustomed role of supplicant that the United States adopted in deal- 
ing with the oil merchants of the Persian Gulf. 
In our opinion, the cumulative effects of these policies created the eco- 
nomic vulnerability conducive to the Arabs' use of the oil embargo as a 
political weapon; in that sense, it was a sequela, rather than a cause. But 
its  demonstrated success changed the  economics  of  policy  planning- 
particularly with regard to  the tradeoffs among security of  supply and 
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Project Independence  and U.S. Supplies of Oil and Natural Gas 
An evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with an undertaking 
such as Project Independence, which aims at total U.S.  self-sufficiency in 
oil by 1980, is an exercise fraught with uncertainty.3 In an admirable first 
approximation  of the supply and demand balances involved, a study group 
at MIT acknowledge that all of their forecasts are necessarily imprecise.4 
The econometric models of supply and demand for fossil fuels are subject 
to error within the range of data upon which they were estimated, and the 
forecasts are well beyond the range of the price data.5 The noneconometric 
estimates of availability and uses of fuels are not amenable to  sensitivity 
analysis through parametric  variation.6 And the conjuncture within which 
3. In the subsequent  analysis  and simulations,  we consider  only crude oil from con- 
ventional  domestic  sources,  omitting  exotic sources  such as synthetic  crude oil, oil shale, 
or tar sands. 
4. The Policy Study Group of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory,  "Energy  Self-Suffi- 
ciency: An Economic  Evaluation,"  Techinology  Review,  Vol. 76 (May 1974), pp. 23-58. 
5. For example,  there  may be undeterminable  biases in the econometric  work on oil 
and natural  gas supply  done by Edward  W. Erickson  and Robert M. Spann,  in "Supply 
Response  in a Regulated  Industry:  The Case of Natural  Gas," Bell  Jolurnal  of Econlomics 
and Management  Science, Vol. 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 94-121, and by Paul W. MacAvoy 
and Robert  S. Pindyck,  in "Alternative  Regulatory  Policies  for Dealing  with the Natural 
Gas  Shortage,"  Bell Joucrnal  of Economics  anid Maniagerne;t Science,  Vol.  4 (Autumn 
1973),  pp. 454-98. These biases might arise because  of the definitional  basis of the dis- 
covery  series  used  and because  wellhead  price  regulation  by the Federal  Power  Commis- 
sion caused  real  natural-gas  prices  to stabilize  or decrease  during  the 1960s.  Erickson  and 
Spann used a series  that credits  subsequent  extensions  and revisions  to the year of dis- 
covery.  The closer one is to the present  in such a series  the fewer  the years of extensions 
and revisions.  The result  may be that later  years'  discoveries  are arbitrarily  smaller  than 
earlier  years' discoveries.  As a consequence,  in a period during which real prices are 
declining,  the estimated  elasticity  of supply  may be biased  upward.  This problem  is not 
so severe  for MacAvoy  and Pindyck  because  they model extensions  and revisions  sepa- 
rately. But the real price of natural gas was relatively  stable over the period covered 
by their estimations.  Thus, the trend for the 1960s may be only random deviations 
around  a point on the natural-gas  supply curve. 
6. For example,  the National Petroleum  Council  supply  cases define  average  "price" 
so as to provide  an average  after-tax  rate of return  on average book value. "Price"  is a 
slack variable  to relate after-tax net profit and net investment  as measured by total 
balance  sheet assets from year to year in order  to generate  industry  income statements. 
The analysis  is not incremental  in the sense that incremental  discoveries  or production 
are some well-defined  function of incremental  investment.  The NPC supply cases are 
designed  to cover investment  expenditures  out of current  revenues.  Despite the other 
merits  of the NPC supply  cases, the result  is that the original  NPC study is not suscep- 
tible to  sensitivity analysis. See National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Olitlook: Edward W. Erickson, Stephen W. Millsaps, and Robert M. Spann  453 
market forces will operate is uncertain.7 Quantitative analysis must  be 
supplemented  by qualitative  judgments.8 
Critical uncertainties  revolve around the following aspects of the prob- 
lem: (1) the price and security of oil in world markets and its landed cost 
in U.S. markets; (2) whether U.S. natural gas markets will be allowed to 
clear through deregulation of the wellhead price; (3) the effects of environ- 
mental regulation and technology upon the unit costs (and permissibility) 
of utilizing certain energy sources; (4) the extent to which new supplies of 
oil and gas from conventional sources in the United  States can  be eco- 
nomically exploited; (5) the tax treatment of  income from oil  and  gas 
operations (and other extractive aspects of the energy industries) and  the 
effect of alternative tax policies on supply and demand balances; and (6) 
the  resolution of  the  antitrust complaint  filed against eight  major  oil 
companies by the Federal Trade Commission. 
In this paper, estimates are made of the long-run response of oil supply 
to price and tax incentives. As in previous such estimates in this industry, 
it is assumed that markets are typified by  competition  among  sellers.9 
The Federal  Trade Commission considers the tax treatment of income from 
oil and gas operations a crucial determinant of the competitiveness of the 
petroleum industry. The degree of competition and tax policy also figure 
in the economic and environmental regulation of the development of  off- 
shore oil and gas reserves. Thus, before considering the effect of reducing 
or eliminating existing tax incentives on future balances of the supply and 
demand for energy in the United States, we must examine the question of 
competition. 
A Report of t/le Nationtal  Petroleumn  Counicil's  Committee onl U.S. Enzergy  Outtlook  (Wash- 
ington: NPC, 1972),  Chap. 4. 
7. With  regard  to conjuncture,  Alfred  Marshall  notes,"..  .'we understand  [conjunc- 
ture to be] the sum total of the technical,  economic, social and legal conditions; which 
...  determine  the  demand  for  and  supply  of  goods  ...'"  Priniciples of  Econiomics 
(9th ed., Macmillan,  1961), Vol. 1, p. 125, note 1. 
8. Many of the factors  listed above may be regarded  as elements  that were held un- 
changed  or included  in the error  term, for econometric  estimations  based on data from 
the 1950s  and 1960s. Nevertheless,  they form an important  part of the data base. This 
means,  however,  that simulations  based  on estimations  from this period  must be treated 
circumspectly. 
9. Those who have done econometric  work on oil and gas supply (such as Paul 
MacAvoy, Franklin  Fisher, and ourselves)  are often also students  of the economics of 
antitrust  and industrial  organization.  Assumptions of competitiveness  were not made 
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Competition  in the U.S. Petroleum  Industry 
The Federal Trade Commission advances a number of hypotheses with 
regard to competition at all stages of the U.S.  petroleum industry, using 
data for the period 1951-71.10  We deal here with the FTC hypotheses about 
the depletion allowance and vertical integration, cooperative rather than 
competitive behavior in gasoline marketing, and barriers to entry in re- 
fining.11  This examination is important for at least two reasons. First, if 
the industry is in fact effectively competitive, the analytical and intellectual 
resources spent in the recent debate on the issue could better be allocated 
to more substantial issues of energy policy. Second, most simulations of 
energy balances under alternative policy  scenarios (including those  re- 
ported below) are based on econometric estimations that assume effective 
competition on the supply side of oil and gas markets. 
THE  DEPLETION  ALLOWANCE 
The FTC alleges that the depletion allowance is used by vertically inte- 
grated petroleum companies to  "squeeze" independent refiners through 
manipulation of  the  price of  crude  oil.12  The  allegation relies on  the 
logically inconsistent argument  that an increase  in the supply of crude oil in- 
duced by a depletion allowance results  in a higher price for crude oil; but its 
venerated position in public policy debates makes it useful to address it 
in detail.13 
10. See "Preliminary  Federal  Trade  Commission  Staff Report on Its Investigation  of 
the Petroleum  Industry,"  released  as Senate  Committee  Print,  Investigation  of the  Petro- 
leum  Industry,  Printed  for the Use of the Permanent  Subcommittee  on Investigations  of 
the Committee  on Government  Operations,  93 Cong. 1 sess. (1973). 
11. For additional  discussion  of competition  in the U.S. petroleum  industry,  see the 
relevant  papers  in The  Energy  Qluestion,  Vol. 2. 
12. See Investigation  of the  Petroleum  Industry,  pp. 17, 26, 29, 35, and Appendix B. 
Several  members  of the Brookings  panel have wondered  why we take the FTC allega- 
tions seriously,  especially  with regard  to the depletion  allowance.  We feel compelled  to 
take them  seriously  because  the FTC takes them seriously.  See FTC Docket 8934, In the 
Matter  of Exxon Corporation  et al., Complaint  Counsel's  Prediscovery  Statement  (July 
18, 1973), pp. 93-95. 
13. For its genesis, see, for example, Melvin G. de Chazeau and Alfred E. Kahn, 
Integration  and Competition  in the Petroleum  Industry  (Yale University Press, 1959), 
pp. 221-22. The basic proposition of the FTC argument  was made repeatedly  to the 
Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control. See Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Edward W. Erickson, Stephen W. Millsaps, and Robert M. Spann  455 
The FTC argument starts with the fact that the depletion  allowance 
allows crude-oil producers to deduct 22 percent of the value of their pro- 
duction from taxable income.14 Does it pay a vertically integrated firm to 
set a high internal transfer price on crude oil to shift profits from refining 
to production, with its lower effective tax rate? The effect, according to the 
FTC, is to raise the price of crude oil and, by reducing the profitability of 
refining, to squeeze independent refiners out of the market. 
Suppose that large, vertically integrated petroleum firms did attempt to 
behave in the fashion hypothesized by the FTC.15 The internal transfer 
prices of crude oil would then exceed the costs (including a competitive 
return on capital) of producing crude oil, and new firms would be attracted 
to the industry. "Ratable-take provisions" prevent discrimination in pur- 
chasing crude by owners of gathering  lines. A substantial body of evidence 
indicates that entry into  the industry is  relatively easy,  even for  small 
firms;'6 and, in fact, the number of crude-oil producers is quite large and 
fluctuates as economic conditions change. 
Control,  The Oil Import  Question,  A Report on the Relationship  of Oil Imports to the 
National  Security  (1970),  p. 80, note 25. We  will try  to put it to rest.  But, as with all "free- 
lunch"  arguments,  it appears  to have a life independent  of facts or logic. 
14. Prior  to the Tax Reform  Act of 1969, this percentage  was 27.5 percent;  the de- 
duction  cannot  exceed  50 percent  of net revenue.  The crude-oil  and natural-gas  industries 
also enjoy the privilege  of expensing  intangible  drilling  costs. 
15. The condition necessary  for such a strategy  to be successful  is that each of the 
majors  have  a self-sufficiency  ratio  in excess  of (1 -  r)/(l  -  T -  Tr),  where  r is the rate 
of percentage  depletion  and  Tis the corporate  income  tax rate.  See Stephen  L. McDonald, 
Petroleum  Conservation  in the United  States: An Economic  Analysis  (Johns Hopkins 
Press  for Resources  for the Future,  1971),  p. 192.  If the values  for r and T are 22 percent 
and 48 percent,  respectively,  a firm would need a self-sufficiency  ratio greater  than 83 
percent.  Only two of the eight majors  meet this condition; moreover,  only four of the 
seventeen  firms  listed  in Table  11-5,  p. 20, of the FTC report  meet it. Thus, the possibility 
of intercompany  compensation  by means of side payments  within the group of majors, 
or the top seventeen,  is remote.  Internal  Revenue  Service  Regulation 1.613-3A  requires 
that petroleum  firms  use arm's  length  prices  or the "representative  market  or field price" 
as internal  transfer  prices  for tax purposes.  The effectiveness  of this requirement  depends 
upon IRS enforcement,  and perhaps  also upon private  rulings  by the IRS. Tax Analysts 
and Advocates, a public-interest  tax-law firm, has recently  won on appeal a suit re- 
quiring  the IRS retrospectively  to divulge  private  rulings;  see Tax Notes, Vol. 2 (August 
26, 1974),  p. 3. Such private  rulings  will be published  in Tax Notes, the weeldy publica- 
tion of Tax Analysts  and Advocates. 
16. See, for example,  James W. McKie, "Market  Structure  and Uncertainty  in Oil 
and Gas Exploration," Quarterly  Journal of Economics,  Vol. 74 (November 1960), 
pp. 543-71; Jesse W. Markham,  "The Competitive  Effects of Joint Bidding by Oil 
Companies  for Offshore  Oil Leases," in Jesse W. Markham  and Gustav F.  Papanek 456  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2.1974 
The depletion allowance gave the majors at most  2.7 cents (now  2.2 
cents) of tax benefit on their own production for every 10-cent increase 
in the internal transfer price. But every additional  10 cents paid to  an 
independent producer for purchased crude oil gave them no benefit at all. 
At a simple average  self-sufficiency  ratio of slightly more than 50 percent- 
that is, where 50 percent of the oil processed is owned by the refiner- 
such a policy would be a net drain on profits.17 
The problems raised by the FTC allegations are compounded by the 
discussion of the possibility of "passing on" supposedly higher crude-oil 
prices in the form of higher product prices. According to the FTC: 
De Chazeau  and Kahn  developed  a simple  model  to examine  this relationship. 
They determined  that a company  with a self-sufficiency  greater  than 77 percent 
would  benefit  from  a crude  price  increase  even  if this increase  were  not passed  on 
in the price  of products  at all. If 50 percent  of the price  increase  were  passed  on, a 
company  with  a degree  of self-sufficiency  in excess of 38.5 percent  would benefit 
from  a price  increase  ...  based  on the 271/2  percent  depletion  allowance.... 
Using the identical  model and substituting  the present 22 percent depletion 
(eds.),  I,zdustrial Organizatioit anid  Econiomic  Developmnent  (Houghton  Mifflin,  1970);  and 
Robert M. Spann  and Edward  W. Erickson.  "Entry  and Competition  in Joint Ventures 
for Offshore  Petroleum  Exploration,"  available  from the authors.  Even price-leadership 
or dominant-firm  oligopoly models presume  that the dominant  firm either  can prevent 
entry or must include the responses  of other firms to price-setting  behavior  in the cal- 
culus of costs and benefits.  Moreover,  strong  evidence  suggests  that the majors,  through 
joint ventures  with smaller firms for lease bids on the outer continental shelf, have 
actually  facilitated  the entry  of smaller  firms  into offshore  explorations  and production 
activity  in the Gulf of Mexico. Such behavior  would be strictly  against the interests  of 
the majors  were they acting according  to the FTC depletion-allowance  hypothesis. 
17. In this  context,  the self-sufficiency  ratio  is the fraction  of a company's  domestic  re- 
finery  runs  that  are  accounted  for by its own domestic-crude  production.  The simple  aver- 
age self-sufficiency  ratio, rather  than an average  self-sufficiency  weighted  by production 
or reserves,  is the appropriate  measure,  because  the variable  of interest  to any firm in 
terms of its own profitability  is its own self-sufficiency  ratio. Firms with low self-suffi- 
ciency  ratios have supported  the depletion  allowance  because  in its absence  they would 
have had to pay more for purchased  crude oil. At given levels of prices,  imports, and 
demand  factors,  the effect of the depletion  allowance  is to make more domestic  crude 
oil available  than would otherwise be the case. For the FTC hypothesis  to hold, the 
major  producers  must then be willing to continue buying  crude oil to support  a given 
price,  or support  the price  of crude  oil by cutting  production  by an amount  equal  to the 
increased production of  nonmajors and new entrants.  This contradicts  the  original 
FTC argument  because  the only way the majors  could produce  the same level of refined 
product  in such a situation is to buy crude oil from the independents.  In either case 
the majors  would be giving up their own production  to subsidize that of nonmajors. 
Yet the original  FTC contention  was that the majors desired  to shift profits from the 
refining  segment  of the industry  to the production  segment. Edward W. Erickson, Stephen W. Millsaps, and Robert M. Spann  457 
allowance  only alters  their conclusions  slightly.  If the price increase  is not [sic] 
passed  on, a company  with  a self-sufficiency  in excess  of 40.4  percent  would  bene- 
fit from a price  increase.'8 
Over the period 1951-72, the real price of gasoline (excluding tax) fell by 
25 percent and the ratio of the real price per gallon of gasoline to the real 
price per barrel of crude oil fell from 9.4 percent to 6.8 percent, a drop of 
27.7 percent. The FTC depletion-allowance hypothesis appears neither to 
be internally  logically consistent, nor to conform with the facts.19  We will 
return below to the real effects of the depletion allowance. 
Finally, the FTC arguments against the depletion allowance are out of 
touch with the literature.20  The normal workings of the marketplace pre- 
vent the behavior they hypothesize. Most  of the critics of the depletion 
allowance have argued for its repeal, not on the grounds that it increases 
the prices of  crude oil,  but  on  the grounds that it  is  a  subsidy to  the 
petroleum industry that imposes the usual misallocation. 
Competitive  Rather  Than  Cooperative  Behavior 
Perhaps the greatest puzzle with regard to  the FTC allegation of co- 
operative rather than competitive behavior in the domestic petroleum in- 
18.  See Investigation of the Petroleum Industry, pp.  19, 20. 
19. A rudimentary  empirical  test of the FTC hypothesis is to track the ratios of 
crude-oil  stocks to crude-oil  production,  crude-oil  stocks to refinery  runs, refined-prod- 
uct stocks to refinery  runs, refined-product  stocks to total demand,  and refined  product 
to total domestic  demand  over  the 1950s  and 1960s.  Although the refined-product  stocks 
ratios rose during  the 1950s, they declined  during the 1960s, and the crude-oil stocks 
ratios  declined  over  the entire  period.  Rather  than demonstrating  the inventory  accumu- 
lation  implicit  in the FTC hypothesis  about  the depletion  allowance,  this pattern  approxi- 
mates  the behavior  one would expect  from  more  efficient  management  of inventories  in a 
geographically  more closely connected national market. Saul Hymans has raised the 
perceptive  point that since the depletion allowance did not change over the 1950-68 
period,  we should not expect to see major  changes  in these  ratios.  But the FTC hypoth- 
esis is that the depletion  allowance  has served  to make crude-oil  prices  artificially  high. 
In such a situation even if demand were shifting to the riglht  over time, such price 
would induce  inventory  accumulation.  Moreover,  between  1950  and 1968,  the real price 
of crude oil  decreased.  The  depletion allowance and related special tax provisions 
represent  a problem  in the efficiency  of resource  allocation  and a case study  in the politi- 
cal power  primarily  of the nonintegrated  firms,  not of market  power on the part of the 
majors. 
20. See Stephen W. Millsaps, Robert M. Spann, and Edward W. Erickson, "Tax 
Incentives  in the US Petroleum  Industry,"  in The  Enzergy  Question,  Vol. 2, pp. 99-122; 458  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
dustry  is found in the demand conditions for gasoline. Gasoline is the most 
important refinery output, and its marketing is given special emphasis by 
the FTC. Real gasoline prices, including and excluding tax, generally de- 
creased over the years 1951-72. The real price of gasoline, excluding tax, 
fell 25 percent from 26.1 cents to  19.5 cents per gallon over the period. 
Although nominal taxes increased from an average of 6.8 cents to  11.7 
cents per gallon, the real price of gasoline, including tax, fell 6.1 cents per 
gallon, a decrease of more than 17 percent. For purposes of evaluating the 
competitive price performance of the gasoline market and the petroleum 
industry, gasoline prices excluding taxes are the relevant measure.2' The 
real tax per gallon actually rose slightly over the 1951-72 period, so  the 
price decline over this period in both the series may be  attributable to 
competitively induced decreases in industry receipts per gallon. 
Competitive behavior and performance in the domestic petroleum in- 
dustry are also reflected  in real refinery  margins. Over the 1952-72 period, 
these fell by over 39 cents per barrel, or 31.7 percent.22  The real price of 
crude oil, the principal noncapital refinery input, was roughly constant 
over this period. The overall profitability of the eight major refinery com- 
panies declined, but remained approximately equal to that for all manu- 
facturing. At the same time, demand increased substantially. The behavior 
of  refinery margins, long-run profit rates, and real gasoline prices in  a 
period of expanding demand suggests how strong competition spurs the 
adoption of new technology. Since the majors now control the better part 
of refinery capacity, they were pivotal in this phenomenon.23 If the real 
price  of  gasoline fell  because the  majors were aggressively expanding 
Spann, Erickson,  and Millsaps, "Percentage  Depletion and the Price and Output of 
Domestic  Crude  Oil,"  in General  Tax Reform,  Panel  Discussions  before  the House Com- 
mittee on Ways and Means,  93 Cong. 1 sess. (1973), Pt. 9, pp. 1309-28; and Erickson 
and Milisaps, "Taxes, Goals, and Efficiency,"  in The Economics  of Federal Subsidy 
Programs,  A Compendium  of Papers  submitted  to the Joint Economic Committee,  92 
Cong. 2 sess. (1972),  Pt. 3, pp. 286-304. 
21. For data on gasoline prices and taxes, see the American Petroleum Institute, 
Petroleum Facts and Figures, 1971 Edition, p. 468, and National Petroleum News,  Fact- 
book Issue (McGraw-Hill,  May 1973),  p. 101. The deflator  is the consumer  price index 
from the Economic Report of the President, February 1974, Table  C-44, p. 300. 
22.  See Investigation of the Petroleum Indulstry,  Table  10, p. 35, and Economic Report 
of the President, February 1974, Table C-49, p. 305. 
23.  See Inivestigation  of the Petroleum Indust,y, Table 11-3, p. 18, and Table V-1, p. 33. Edward W. Erickson, Stephen W. Millsaps, and Robert M. Spann  459 
refining capacity and competing for incremental shares of  the  gasoline 
market, the cooperative-behavior hypothesis falls. If the majors were co- 
operatively restraining expansions of refining capacity and the real price 
of gasoline fell because of expansions of refining capacity by nonmajors, 
the hypothesis of barriers to entry falls. In our view of the evidence, the 
real price of gasoline, refinery  margins, and long-run profit rates declined 
because both the FTC hypotheses-about  barriers to entry and about co- 
operative behavior-are  wide of the mark.24 
Our conclusions with regard  to effective competition apply to the domes- 
tic U.S. petroleum industry.  The substantial market power now being exer- 
cised in the world petroleum market resides in the governments of  the 
producing countries. In our opinion, functional divestiture of the major 
oil companies-however  defined-would  contribute little to curtailing the 
market power of producing countries, or to mitigating the inflationary  and 
other effects of its exercise.25  The domestic petroleum industry is effectively 
24. The cooperative-conduct  hypothesis  of the FTC is not well defined.  If the allega- 
tion is that "cooperative  conduct"  on the part of the majors  leads to a monopoly solu- 
tion for price and output in the gasoline market, this is contradicted  by considerable 
econometric  evidence  that prices  for gasoline have been in the inelastic  region of both 
the short- and long-run demand functions. See J. Ramsey, R. Rasche, and B. Allen, 
"An Analysis of the Private  and Commercial  Demand for Gasoline," Department  of 
Economics Working Paper (Michigan State University, 1973; processed); James C. 
Burrows  and  T.  A.  Domencich,  An  Analysis  of  thle United States  Oil  Import  Quota 
(Heath, 1970);  H. S. Houthakker  and Lester  D. Taylor,  Conisumer  Demand  in the Unlited 
States, 1929-1970  (Harvard  University  Press, 1966); H. S. Houthakker  and P. K. Ver- 
leger, "Dynamic Demand Analysis of Selected Energy Resources," Working Paper 
(Data Resources,  Inc., 1973;  processed);  and Louis Phlips, "A Dynamic Version  of the 
Linear  Expenditure  Model,"  Review of Economics  and Statistics,  Vol.  54  (November 
1972),  pp. 450-58. Additional  evidence  indicates  the implausibility  of the FTC argument. 
Because  of the increase  in per  capita disposable  income over the 1951-72 period  and the 
increasing  suburbanization  of American  society,  it is likely that a systematic  change  took 
place  in the structure  of demand  for gasoline-that it became  gradually  less responsive  to 
price.  This possibility  is supported  by the findings  of Ramsey and his coworkers.  When 
demand  becomes  more price  inelastic,  the optimum  profit-maximizing  response  in a co- 
operative  market  is to raise  real  prices.  But the actual  record  of real  prices  in the domestic 
gasoline  market  over the 1951-72 period  was one of progressive  decline.  Franco Modi- 
gliani  has pointed  out that  the elasticity-of-demand  test, strictly  interpreted,  discriminates 
only between  effective  competition  and complete  monopolization.  The question  then be- 
comes whether  the number  of gasoline  refiners  and marketers  is sufficient  to qualify the 
market  as a large-numbers  case. In our opinion, it does. 
25. See, for example, M. A. Adelman, "The World Oil Market," in The Energy 
Question,  Vol. 1, pp. 5-40, especially  pp. 10-18, 34. 460  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
competitive and it is in this context  that public policy  and the  supply 
response to  changed economic incentives must be considered.26 In this 
regard, the special tax provisions enjoyed by the industry are a critical 
factor. To these we now turn. 
A Model of Supply 
In addition to  prices, environmental regulation, and  other legal and 
technical considerations, special tax incentives influence the activity of the 
petroleum  industry.  These incentives include the immediate writeoff of dry- 
hole costs and of some capital expenditures through expensing of intan- 
gible drilling costs, and the percentage depletion allowance.27 In order to 
estimate  the effect of these special tax incentives upon the crude-oil reserves 
held by the industry, we develop a model of crude-oil reserves stocks. Our 
principal objective is to  derive an estimating equation for  the  long-run 
equilibrium  stock of crude-oil reserves  that contains only observable values 
of variables that are exogenous to the firm in the current time period. 
THE  ESTIMATING EQUATION 
The  relationship used  to  describe the  long-run equilibrium level  of 
desired oil reserves is 
(1)  R* =  A  Z?7Z?2  Z,7n 
26. Our  conclusion  of effective  competition  in the private  sector  of the U.S. petroleum 
industry  should not be construed  as a belief that resource  allocation  in U.S. petroleum 
has been efficient.  But the major  inefficiencies  of resource  allocation  result  from failures 
in public  policy  or regulation.  These  have  included  wellhead  ceiling  prices  for natural  gas, 
the failure  to unitize  U.S. crude-oil  reservoirs,  market-demand  prorationing,  oil import 
controls,  and special  tax provisions.  All but the first  of these provide  substantial  benefits 
to the industry.  In our opinion,  the principal  "credit"  for implementing  and maintaining 
these public policies  resides  with the independent  producing  sector and its role in state 
and national politics. This is not a pejorative  comment: this sector has substantial 
interests  that they have effectively  protected.  To make efficacious  policy, policy analysts 
must understand  the facts. 
27. Percentage  depletion is  often used as a  shorthand expression for the whole 
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where 
R* =  the long-run equilibrium level of desired oil reserves 
Zi =  the prices, user costs, production restrictions, and other variables 
that determine R* 
7i =  parameters  representing  the elasticities of desired reserves  with re- 
spect to its determinants. 
The principal  economic determinants  of desired reserves  are the expected 
price of oil, A and the "user cost" of oil reserves, C. User cost is a measure 
of the implicit price to the firm of capital embodied in oil reserves and is 
defined in its precise analytic form below. If, as in modern capital theory, 
desired reserves  are constrained to be equally sensitive to changes in price 
and in user cost, the ratio of expected price to user cost, P/C,  would deter- 
mine desired reserves.28  In the empirical estimation of the model, we com- 
pare the constrained version with an unconstrained version in which the 
effects of price and user cost are estimated separately. 
Domestic oil production was for years subject to production restrictions 
that limited the fraction of rated capacity at which wells could be operated. 
The typical measure of production restrictions for those states employing 
them is Texas shutdown days, K.29 These production restrictions influence 
the desired level of oil reserves in at least two ways: they directly influence 
expectations about the price of oil; and they affect the value of reserves  for 
properly  wish to distinguish  between  percentage  depletion  and expensing  of intangibles; 
in fact we do so ourselves  in the simulations  presented  below. The likelihood in the 
1974 session of Congress  for reform of the special provisions  affecting  the taxation of 
income  from oil and gas production  is not high. The proposed  Oil and Gas Energy  Tax 
Act of the House Ways and Means Committee  is apparently  stalled  in the House Rules 
Committee.  Some of the same language appears  in the general tax reform bill of the 
Ways and Means Committee, but its enactment in the 1974 session of Congress is 
also unlikely. 
28. Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Tax Policy and Investment  Behavior," 
American Economic Review, Vol.  57 (June 1967), pp. 391-414. 
29. The current  terminology  is "market-demand  factor," or MDF. Shutdown  days 
are simply  equal to (1 -  MDF) times 365 days. If the market-demand  factor is 50 per- 
cent, a well that is not exempt  from restriction  is allowed to produce  at half of its rated 
capacity.  For a discussion  of some of the intricacies  of market-demand  prorationing,  see 
Edward  W. Erickson,  "Crude  Oil Prices,  Drilling  Incentives  and the Supply  of New Dis- 
coveries,"  Natural  Resources  Journal,  Vol. 10 (January  1970),  pp. 27-52; and McDonald, 
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any given price and user cost by restricting the rate at which reserves can 
be pumped out and sold. 
For  any given assessment of  demand, production restrictions should 
raise the expected price of oil.  Since we have no well-established way of 
measuring the formation of  expected prices,  fi,  we settle for assuming 
that they are determined by the current price, Pt, and current and lagged 
production restrictions, Ki and Kt-1: 
(2)  Pt =  f(Pt,  Kt, Kt_). 
Since interest rates are positive, production restrictions reduce the value 
of  reserves for  any given expected price by  limiting the rate at which 
reserves  can be converted into revenues from the sale of oil. Thus produc- 
tion restrictions enter into the calculation of desired reserves directly as 
well as through their influence on expected price. Because of these two 
effects, the direction of  the net influence of  production restrictions on 
desired reserves is uncertain. 
User cost. The tax incentives that are of particular  concern in the present 
policy debate on energy, and that are a main focus of this paper, enter the 
oil-supply picture through their effect on user cost. The definition of the 
user cost of oil reserves, Ct, is30 
(3)  Ct =  qt  Ir(  -  T  + (1Tr-v) 
where 
qt =  finding costs per barrel of additional reserves 
r =  the opportunity cost of committing funds to petroleum exploration, 
or the cost of capital 
T =  the corporate income tax rate 
y  =  the fraction of capital expenditure  that can be expensed immediately 
5 =  the rate of depreciation of the capital stock or reserves 
30. A rather lengthy proof of this formulation  of user cost is available from the 
authors. For background  on this relation, see Hall and Jorgenson,  "Tax Policy and 
Investment  Behavior"; Robert M. Coen, "Effects of Tax Policy on Investment  in 
Manufacturing,"  in American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings  of the 
Eightieth Annual Meeting,  1967 (American Economic Review, Vol.  58,  May  1968),  pp. 
200-11; and  J. C. Cox and  A. W. Wright,  "The  Determinants  of Investment  in Petroleum 
Reserves  and Their Implications  for Public Policy," Working Paper (University of 
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v  the fraction  of capital  expenditure  that is depreciable  for tax pur- 
poses 
r  =  the rate of percentage depletion.3' 
Increases  in user  cost reduce  the desired  level of reserves.  In turn,  user 
cost is negatively  related  to the rate of percentage  depletion  and inversely 
related to  y, the fraction  of capital expenditure  that can be expensed 
immediately.  For example,  if expensing  of intangible  drilling  costs were 
eliminated  (while the depletion  allowance  was retained unchanged),  'y 
would decrease  and therefore  v, the fraction  of capital  expenditure  that is 
depreciable  for tax purposes,  would  increase;  the net effect  of decreasing 
'y,  thereby  increasing  v, is to increase  C,.32 
The lack of adequate  data  on finding  costs, qj,  complicates  the measure- 
ment of user  cost. Because  of systematic  variation  in success  ratios  among 
PAD (Petroleum  Administration  for Defense)  districts,  average  discovery 
sizes,  average  well  depths,  and  costs  per  foot drilled,  it is likely  that  average 
finding  costs vary  across  PAD districts.33  At the margin,  however,  net of 
locational  and quality  differentials,  finding  costs should be equal for all 
districts.  In the  estimations  discussed  below,  district  dummy  variables,  des- 
ignated Dj, are used to pick up average  cross-sectional  variation.34  The 
31. For a more complete  description  of these data, see Spann, Erickson,  and Mill- 
saps, "Percentage  Depletion." 
32. The values  for y and v do not sum to unity, however,  because  capital  expenditure 
for oil development  generally  includes  expensable,  depreciable,  and depletable  items. 
33. The PAD districts  are defined  roughly as follows: District 1 is Appalachia  and 
the East Central  Coast; District 2 is the midcontinental  states; District 3 is the Gulf 
Coast and Southwest;  District  4 is the Rocky Mountain  area; and District  5 is the West 
Coast states and Alaska and Hawaii. 
34. This approach  differs  from  that used in the report  prepared  for the U.S. Treasury 
Department  by CONSAD  Research  Corporation,  "The  Economic  Factors  Affecting  the 
Level of Domestic Petroleum  Reserves,"  Pt. 4 of Tax Reform  Studies and Proposals, 
U.S. Treasury  Department,  Joint Publication  of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means and the Senate  Committee  on Finance,  91 Cong. 1 sess. (1969). The CONSAD 
study used discovery-development  costs per barrel  of oil for 1947-63 from Petroleum 
Outlook  for September  1964. This series has considerable  yearly fluctuation,  probably 
due to year-to-year  changes  in the success  rate and average  discovery  sizes of the wells. 
In its  estimation, CONSAD developed exponentially  weighted moving averages of 
qg  to represent  producers'  expectations  of the costs of finding  new reserves.  This tech- 
nique smoothed  the series  somewhat  (pp. 7.17-7.25). A linear regression  of CONSAD 
q, numbers on time yielded q, =  1.13 +  0.0106 YEAR (r2 =  0.033), where q, is in 
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time-series  problem is more difficult.  There is no adequate time series on qt, 
although it probably has been increasing.35  We omit q, from our estimation, 
in effect assuming it is constant over time. The logic of the relations among 
qt, price, and the term in the brackets of the user-cost expression, equation 
(3)-designated  [B]-is  that price and q, are positively related, while [B] 
and q, are negatively related.36  Omission of q, from the estimations intro- 
duces an indeterminate  set of biases in the estimated coefficients for price 
and tax incentives.37  Embedded within our coefficients on price and user 
cost is a set of facts about finding and development costs. The assumption 
we make in the simulations reported below is that this set of facts is well 
behaved over time and continuous with respect to changes in economic 
incentives. 
Actutal  reserves. It takes time to bring actual reserves, RT,  to the level 
of desired reserves. Actual reserve levels, Rt, are assumed to  adjust to de- 
sired reserve levels, R*, according to the following equation: 
(4)  Rt/Rt-,  =  (R  /Rt-i)x; 0 <  X <  1. 
per year. Quadratic  regression  equations were no better. The CONSAD results indi- 
cated that reserve  holdings  were insensitive  to tax-induced  changes  in user costs. For a 
discussion  of these results, see Erickson  and Millsaps, "Taxes,  Goals, and Efficiency," 
and Spann,  Erickson,  and Millsaps,  "Percentage  Depletion." 
35. In his study of drilling  costs, Franklin M. Fisher does find substantial  depth- 
favoring  technological  change.  See his Supply anid  Costs in the U.S. Petroleum Industry: 
Two Econ2ometric  Studies (Johns  Hopkins  Press  for Resources  for the Future,  1964),  Pt. 2, 
and his "Technological  Change  and the Drilling  Cost-Depth  Relationship,  1960-6," in 
The Eniergy Question, Vol. 2, pp. 255-64. Since unit finding  costs are inversely  related  to 
size,  these  observations  are  partially  confirmed  by the trend  to smaller  average  discoveries 
at approximately  constant  real output prices.  The Fisher  findings  indicate  a substantial 
technological  offset to any tendency  toward  increased  finding  costs. The best prospects 
are, however,  drilled  first.  Gordon Kaufman  and Krishna  Challa of MIT have found in 
their  investigations  of sampling  without  replacement  that average  discovery  size withlin  a 
geologic  play  is a tight and strongly  decreasing  function  of time (unpublished  data).  This 
does not mean  that discoveries  are insensitive  to economic  incentives.  The economic de- 
cisions  about which  plays to drill  and the rate at which  to drill  them must still be made. 
But it does suggest  that, with some random  variations,  finding  costs may be increasing 
over  time. 
36. For a discussion  of the terms, see Spann, Erickson, and Millsaps, "Percentage 
Depletion,"  pp. 1318-19.  However,  for the purposes  of the estimations  reported  below, 
we will continue  to denote user cost as Ct. 
37. To the extent that the direction of these biases can be inferred from simple 
correlations,  the coefficient  on price is probably biased downward and those on user 
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The parameter  X  is the adjustment coefficient. The larger X is, the speedier 
is the rate of adjustment.38 
Substituting equation (1) into (4), representing the Zis by the determi- 
nants of desired reserves  just discussed, and taking logarithms, leads to the 
following estimating equation containing only observable variables:39 
(5)  In (Rt,2)  =  do +  d, In (Pt,) +  d2 In (C)  +  d3 In (Kt,) 
+  d4 In (Kt_ ,i) +  d5 Dj +  d6 In (Rt-1,,), 
38. If reserves  are insensitive  to tax-induced  changes in user cost, the speed with 
which the industry  moves from actual to desired  reserves  is of little consequence.  If, 
however,  the relationship  is more sensitive,  knowledge  of the adjustment  speed becomes 
more important, especially to managers of energy planning. In their earlier work, 
CONSAD assumed  a rapid adjustment-within one year. We prefer to estimate the 
adjustment  speed, and our model allows us to do so. The CONSAD assumption is 
based on Almon's finding that capital investment  in petroleum  and coal showed the 
shortest  lag of any standard  industrial  classification  industry  group, with over 95 per- 
cent of investment  occurring  within one year of authorization.  Given Almon's basic as- 
sumptions  that expenditures  come entirely  from previous  appropriations,  that no capital 
expenditure  is made without an appropriation,  and that appropriations  are eventually 
spent, her finding  concerning  the expenditure-appropriation  data for the petroleum  in- 
dustry  is not surprising.  To get an appropriation,  geological  exploration,  lease acquisi- 
tion, and the like must  be completed.  A positive  change  in economic  incentives  causes  in- 
creased  production  out of existing  reserves  and drilling  out of the inventory  of existing 
prospects,  as well as accumulation  and drilling  of new prospects.  For a significant  change 
in economic  incentives,  the latter  component  of the adjustment  process  probably  domi- 
nates.  Thus,  although  the time  required  to bring  a well into production,  once the decision 
to drill  has been made and the project  funded,  is quite short-as  little as two months in 
some cases-the  conclusion  that adjustments  in reserves  are largely  accomplished  within 
each  year  does  not necessarily  follow from  Almon's  results.  Our  kind  of statistical  estima- 
tion of the speed of adjustment,  however,  may not be completely  satisfactory  either,  be- 
cause  the historical  adjustment  process  was probably  significantly  affected  by the rate of 
offshore  leasing  and by market-demand  prorationing.  These  elements  of the conjuncture 
have  changed,  and  the estimated  adjustment  speed  may be too low for current  conditions. 
See Shirley  Almon, "The  Distributed  Lag Between  Capital  Appropriations  and Expendi- 
tures,"  Econrometrica,  Vol. 33 (January  1965),  pp. 178-96. 
39. The estimations  are done directly  in terms of current  and lagged reserves.  In- 
tuitively,  estimation  in terms of first differences  for reserves  might seem appealing,  but 
the model developed  here is for the stock of reserves.  For a model that deals with the 
flow of discoveries,  see Robert M. Spann and Edward  W. Erickson,  "Joint Costs and 
Separability  in Oil and  Gas Exploration,"  in Milton  F. Searl  (ed.), Energy  Modeling:  Art, 
Science,  Practice  (Resources  for the Future, 1973). There is a recursive relationship 
between  production,  discoveries,  and reserves  that allows the independent  estimation 
of only two of the three. 
A more  detailed  development  of the model presented  in the present  paper  is available 
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where 
R =  proved  oil reserves  in thousands  of barrels40 
P  deflated  average  wellhead  price  of oil per barrel4' 
C =  user cost of oil reserves42 
K=  Texas shutdown  days, a measure  of the severity  of production 
restrictions43 
t  a time subscript 
j  a subscript  denoting  PAD district 
D  a vector  of district  dummy  variables. 
The coefficients  in the estimating  equation,  (5), are related  to the param- 
eters, qj  and X  in equations  (1) and (4), as follows: 
di =  qiX  for i =  1, .  ,5 
d6=  1-x. 
Thus,  the coefficients  d, and  d2 in the estimating  equation  directly  measure 
the short-run  elasticity  of oil reserves  with  respect  to prices  and user  costs. 
The long-run  elasticities  of reserves  with  respect  to prices  and  user  costs  are 
given by d1/(l  -  d6) and d2/(  -  d6). 
40. American  Gas Association,  American  Petroleum  Institute,  and Canadian  Petro- 
leum  Association,  Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural  Gas Liquids, and Natural  Gas in  the 
United States  and Canada and  United States  Productive  Capacity  as  of  December  31, 
1970, Vol. 25 (published  jointly by AGA, API, CPA, 1971),  Table III, p. 25, and Table 
111-2,  p. 27. 
41.  American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures, 1971 Edition, pp. 86, 
87, and Economic Report of the President, January 1973, Table  C-48. 
42. The real interest  rate in year t is computed by taking Moody's Aaa bond rate 
and subtracting  out the expected  rate of inflation  defined  by woPt +  wiPt-1  +  w2P_t2, 
where Pti  equals the rate of inflation (from the wholesale price index) in time t-i 
and wo =  0.480, w,  =  0.327, and w2 =  0.193. The weights were derived by summing 
the first twelve, the second twelve, and the third twelve monthly digits as reported  in 
William P. Yohe and Denis S. Karnosky, "Interest  Rates and Price Level Changes, 
1952-69,"  Federal Reserve Bank of St.  Louis Review, Vol.  51 (December  1969), Table 
2, p. 37. The weights  were constrained  to be in the same proportion  as the sums com- 
puted above subject to the constraint  wo +  w,  +  W2 =  1. The percentage  depletion 
allowance  equaled  0.275 for the period 1950-68. The values for Y, v, and a were taken 
from CONSAD Research  Corportation,  "Economic  Factors,"  p. 7.19. 
43. The data  come from  a letter  to the authors  from  the Texas Railroad  Commission, 
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EMPIRICAL  ESTIMATES 
The empirical  estimates  of the model seek answers  to two questions. 
First, are long-run  petroleum  reserves  sensitive  to tax-induced  changes  in 
user costs? Second,  what is the empirical  relation,  if any, between  price 
and  tax incentives?  These  questions  are  of interest  for a number  of reasons. 
In their  evaluation  of Project  Independence,  the MIT Energy  Laboratory 
group  concentrated  on price  incentives.  But  if, in the wake  of the discussion 
of further  reform  of the tax treatment  of income  from oil operations,  the 
provisions  are changed,  the domestic  balance  between  oil and other  fuels 
will change;  and there will be expectations  and perhaps  realizations  of 
similar  changes  for other fuels such as natural  gas, coal, and uranium. 
These  would  be important  to energy-policy  planners,  for they would  alter 
the  balance  between  domestic  and  foreign  sources  of energy  over  the  transi- 
tion period  of Project  Independence  and, furthermore,  affect  its length.44 
The  unconstrained  model.  Unconstrained  estimation  of the model using 
pooled cross-sectional  and time-series  data from 1950-68  yielded  the fol- 
lowing: 
(6)  ln R,i  =  1.41085  +  0.10169  InP,,, -  0.06929  In C, 
(0.71076) (0.09003)  (0.02802) 
-0.06666  In Kr,,  +  0.07607 In Kt-,,, 
(0.08308)  (0.07663) 
+  0.90185 In R1,-1 -  0.48685D, 
(0.04025)  (0.26896) 
-  0.12483D2  -  0.151921D4  -  0.095101D5. 
(0.20352)  (0.21048)  (0.20132) 
R2 = 0.9991; standard  error  of estimate = 0.00238; 
degrees  of freedom =  85. 
44. An additional  reason  for concern  with the first  hypothesis  involves  the CONSAD 
finding that desired  reserve  holdings were insensitive  to elimination of tax incentives. 
In contradiction  to this, and also related to the second question discussed here, are 
the statements  by some industry  spokesmen  that seem to imply that taxes have more 
influence  than prices.  For example,  in a June 1973 statement  prepared  for presentation 
before  the Senate  Committee  on Interior  and Insular  Affairs,  Richard  J. Gonzalez  wrote: 
"Because  of unusual  risks  and the long time lag, investments  in petroleum  involve much 
more uncertainty  concerning  prospective  returns  than most other businesses.  For this 
reason, price alone is not an adequate  incentive  for investment  of funds." 468  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Here and in  the following  equations, the  numbers in  parentheses are 
standard  errors. 
The estimate of the price elasticity of the long-run equilibrium stock of 
reserves  (found by dividing the price coefficient  by one minus the coefficient 
on lagged reserves)  is approximately unity and is consistent with estimates 
from other models.45 A  10 percent increase in price results in approxi- 
mately a 10 percent increase in discoveries, reserves, and production.46 
The user-cost coefficient is  negative and  statistically significant. The 
estimate of the long-run user-cost elasticity of reserves (found by dividing 
the coefficient on user cost  by  one minus the coefficient on the lagged 
reserves variable) is  -0.71.  Thus, in the unconstrained estimation,  a  10 
percent increase in user cost results in approximately a 7 percent decrease 
in reserves. 
The coefficients on production restrictions are unsatisfactory. The posi- 
tive sign on lagged production restrictions and the negative sign on current 
restrictions have no obvious interpretation, and in any case, net out to  a 
very small impact.47 
45. See, for example, Spann and Erickson, "Joint Costs," in En2ergy  Modeling; 
Erickson  and Spann,  "Supply  Response";  and Edward  W. Erickson,  "Economic  Incen- 
tives, Industrial  Structure  and the Supply of Crude Oil Discoveries  in the U.S., 1946- 
1958/59"  (Ph.D. dissertation,  Vanderbilt  University,  1968),  in which  the estimated  long- 
run price  elasticities  of crude-oil  production  and discoveries  are less than the estimate  of 
the price  elasticity  of long-run  equilibrium  reserve  stocks estimated  here.  This difference 
arises from the downward  sloping value of the marginal  product  curve for reserves  as 
capital stock. 
46. In the future,  the ratio of ultimate  recovery  to original  oil-in-place  may increase 
because of price incentives or technological  change. A price-induced  increase in the 
recovery  rate would result  in upward  revisions  of proved  reserves.  Charles  Schultze  has 
pointed out to us that the proportion  of additions to annual reserves  in recent years 
accounted for by "revisions" has grown steadily. The National Petroleum Council 
estimates  that, within plus or minus 5 percent, revisions represent  secondary  reserve 
additions.  At relatively  constant  real prices  for crude  oil, and with the cut in percentage 
depletion in 1969, this pattern of revisions appears to represent  the benefits of tech- 
nological  change.  A larger  proportion  of these reserve  additions have recently  been in 
older fields. This pattern may change under the new price regime; but further tech- 
nological development,  in response to economic incentives, is likely to raise feasible 
recovery  rates. Our estimations  implicitly  include the expansion of secondary  and ter- 
tiary  reserves,  although  technological  change is not explicitly  modeled. 
The NPC estimates  are from U.S. Energy Outlook:  Oil and Gas Availability  (NPC, 
1973),  p. 188. 
47. We must confess that this result  may be the consequence  of one ad hoc assump- 
tion we made-that  the effects of production restrictions  could be estimated using a 
two-parameter  lag distribution.  Although the lag structure  for production  restrictions Edward  W.  Erickson,  Stephen  W. Millsaps,  and  Robert  M. Spann  469 
The estimate  of the speed-of-adjustment  parameter,  X,  is approximately 
0.10. (The coefficient  on lagged reserves  is 1 -  X and is approximately 
+0.9.) Thus, adjustment  from actual to desired  reserve  levels proceeds 
relatively  slowly:  approximately  10 percent  of the gap between  the two is 
closed  each  year.48  At this rate  it would  take about  seven  years  to accom- 
plish  50 percent  of the total desired  change.  It must  be remembered,  how- 
ever, that the rate of adjustment  may be affected  by factors such as the 
amount  of offshore  leasing,  which  has shifted  in a manner  that may have 
increased  X. In addition,  the incentive  to adjust  may be affected  by the 
magnitude  of a price  change,  and recent  changes  have been well outside 
the range  of past experience.  Even  if the prospective  speed  of adjustment 
for the stock of reserves  were  50 percent  faster  than that indicated  by our 
estimations,  it would be relatively  slow and a serious constraint  upon 
policymakers  with, say, five-year  horizons. 
The  constrained  model.  In the unrestricted  estimates  just presented,  the 
coefficients  on price  and  user  cost are  not precisely  equal.  On  the  hypothesis 
that  an economic  incentive  is an economic  incentive,  alternative  estimates 
can be made  with  the coefficients  on price  and user  cost constrained  to be 
equal.  The  efficiency  of this restriction  can be tested  using  the weak  mean- 
on reserves  in past periods may be substantially  more complicated,  we felt that the 
data series  was insufficient  to estimate  a more complex lag structure.  In addition, as a 
result  of such practices  as calendar-day  testing, actual production  restrictions  in recent 
years may not have been as onerous as nominal production restrictions  appear to 
indicate. For a discussion of calendar-day  testing, see Erickson, "Crude Oil Prices," 
pp. 44-49, and for a discussion of related  aspects of the administration  of production 
restrictions, see McDonald,  Petrolewan  Conservation in thze  United States. 
48. There is a distinction  between  the speed of adjustment  of the reserves  stock to 
the desired  level of reserves  and the speed of adjustment  of the rate of discoveries  to 
the desired  rate of discoveries.  The former  will always be slower  than the latter. Cumu- 
lative production  and lagged reserves  are positively  related,  and the inclusion of lagged 
reserves  in a pooled time-series  and cross-section  estimation biases the coefficient  on 
lagged  reserves  toward unity. This tendency  is partially  offset by the inclusion of PAD 
district  dummies.  Although they are individually  insignificant,  the district  dummies  all 
have  the anticipated  sign, and their  inclusion  or exclusion  should  be  judged  as a package. 
As such, they are significant.  In addition, to the extent that the coefficient  on lagged 
reserves  is biased  toward unity, the speed of adjustment  is biased downward.  Whether 
or not this is a desirable  result depends  upon the symmetry  of policymakers'  loss func- 
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square  criterion.49  The  constrained  estimate  of the oil-stock  reserves  equa- 
tion, again  estimated  with annual  data  for 1950-68,  is 
(7)  In Ri  =  1.36664 +  0.07253 (In P,2 -  In CQ) 
(0.69507)  (0.02621) 
-0.05874  In Kt,, +  0.07083 In Kt-,, 
(0.07931)  (0.07467) 
+  0.90414 In R1,-_  -  0.45129D, 
(0.03947)  (0.24635) 
-  0.10710D2  -  0.136021D4  -  0.08167D5. 
(0.19566)  (0.20411)  (0.19636) 
RI  =  0.9990;  standard error of estimate  =  0.00236; 
degrees of freedom  =  86. 
Judging  on the basis of the mean-square  criterion,  one cannot  reject  the 
hypothesis  that price and user cost enter the determination  of reserves 
symmetrically.50  The constrained  equation,  (7), does as well in tracking 
reserves  over  the sample  period  as the unconstrained  equation,  (6). Since 
symmetry  has a theoretical  appeal  and the empirical  estimates  in no way 
refute  it, equation  (7) will be utilized  in the projections  offered  below. 
The constrained  long-run  elasticity  of price  and user cost are plus and 
minus  0.76,  respectively,  lying  between  the  individually  estimated  elasticities 
from equation  (6). Thus a 10 percent  rise in price or decline  in user  costs 
leads,  eventually,  to a 7.6 percent  rise in the supply  of reserves.  The esti- 
mated  adjustment  of reserves  to their  long-run  desired  level  is slow,  just as 
in the unconstrained  equation.  The speed-of-adjustment  parameter,  X, is 
again  0.10, indicating  it takes seven years  to accomplish  half the adjust- 
ment  of reserves  to their  desired  level.  There  is similarly  little  change  in the 
other  coefficient  estimates.  The estimated  effect  of production  restrictions 
is again unsatisfactory,  as it was in the unconstrained  estimates.  In the 
simulations  that follow, however,  we set production  restrictions  equal to 
49. See Carlos  Toro-Vizcarrondo  and T. D. Wallace, "A Test of the Mean Square 
Error  Criterion  for Restrictions  in Linear  Regression,"  Journal  of the  American  Statistical 
Association,  Vol. 63 (June 1968),  pp. 558-72; and T. D. Wallace,  "Weaker  Criteria  and 
Tests for Linear Restrictions  in Regression,"  Econzometrica,  Vol. 40 (July 1972), pp. 
689-98. 
50. The calculated  noncentral  F-statistic  is 0.123 with degrees of freedom equal to 
1 and 85. The noncentrality  factor equals m/2, or 1/2,  since m equals the number  of 
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Table 1. Actual and Predicted U.S. Oil Reserves, 1969-74a 
Billions of barrels 
Year  Actual  Predicted 
1969  29.2  30.6 
1970  28.9  30.3 
1971  27.9  30.2 
1972  26.2  30.0 
1973  25.2  29.8 
1974  ...  30.6 
Sources: Actual reserves  are from American Gas Association, American Petroleum Institute, and Cana- 
dian Petroleum  Association, Reserves  of Crude  Oil, Natural Gas  Liquids,  and Natural Gas in the United  States 
and Canada and United States Productive  Capacity as of December  31, 1973, Vol. 28 (publislled jointly by 
AGA,  API, CPA, 1974), Table III, p. 25, and Table III-2, p. 27. Predicted reserves are derived from text 
equation (7). 
a.  Lower forty-eight states only. 
zero so the estimated coefficients do not directly affect the  1975-85 pre- 
dictions. 
Table 1 illustrates the tracking record of equation (7) for 1969-73, the 
first five years after the end of the estimation period. The principal policy 
change that occurred in this period was the reduction of  the depletion 
allowance from 27.5 to 22.0 percent in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. This 
change is reflected in the user-cost measure employed in the equation. On 
the other hand, a number of other events of this period may have influenced 
the development of reserves  but could not be reflected in the model. These 
include the removal of restrictions on oil imports, the Alaskan discovery 
(whose reserves are not included in this model) followed by the extended 
uncertainty over building the oil pipeline, and the imposition of wage and 
price controls. All these increased the uncertainty of expectations in the oil 
industry;51  and the controls created, in addition, some shortages of inputs 
for the discovery and development process. These factors may help explain 
the growing overprediction of reserves by the model shown in Table  1. 
Since the model is basically concerned with long-run equilibrium  responses, 
we do not regard the prediction errors during this period of turmoil in the 
industry as particularly  significant. Our main interest centers on compari- 
sons of long-run reserves  under alternative prices and tax incentives, which 
can be made even without considering short-run disturbances that cannot 
be accounted for in the model. 
51. For a discussion of the importance  of expectations,  see Erickson and Spann, 
"Supply  Response,"  p. 116, note 43. 472  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Policy  Simulations 
This  section  reports  the  results  of using  equation  (7) to project  the supply 
of U.S. oil reserves  (again,  exclusive  of those in Alaska)  under  alternative 
sets  of tax policies  relating  to the oil industry  and of future  oil prices.  Case 
A assumes  the continuation  of the depletion  allowance  at its current  level, 
and  expensing  of intangibles;  case B eliminates  the first  but maintains  the 
second; case C drops the expensing  of intangibles,  but assumes a de- 
pletion  allowance  at the current  22 percent  level; and case D eliminates 
both provisions.52  The alternative  prices  are $8.00, $10.00,  and $12.00  per 
barrel  in 1974 dollars  in PAD District 3.53 Alaska is omitted  from the 
projections  because  it was  not included  in the data  for the estimation  of the 
coefficients  upon which  the projection  simulations  are based.  The simula- 
tions for the four cases for the period 1975-85  are presented  in Tables  2 
through  5 and take off from the projected  level of reserves  for 1974 of 
30.6 billion  barrels,  shown  in Table 1.54  The tax changes  and price  levels 
that  are  modeled  in the tables  are  maintained  from  the beginning  of 1975. 
Under  all sets of projections,  reserves  increase  noticeably  over the next 
decade  as the effect  of higher  prices,  at all the assumed  prices,  dominates 
even the rise in user  cost induced  by the elimination  of all tax incentives 
assumed  in Table 5. Under the most favorable  conditions  for expanding 
supply-the $12  per  barrel  price  and  the maintenance  of present  tax incen- 
tives,  shown  in Table  2-reserves rise  by roughly  55 percent  between  1974 
52. Elimination  of percentage  depletion is equivalent  to setting the depletion term, 
r, in the user-cost  formulation  equal  to 0.032. The point at which  all depletion  is claimed 
as cost-based  depletion  would be that point at which the allowable  deductions  for cost 
and percentage  depletion  are equal. Based on an estimate  that percentage  depletion  has 
allowed about 85.6 percent  excess recovery  of outlays over cost depletion (CONSAD, 
page 7.31), this breakeven  point would occur when percentage  depletion  was 14.4 per- 
cent of the current  rate. Eliminating  expensing  of intangibles  decreased  y and increased 
v. The total effect  of eliminating  both expensing  of intangibles  and percentage  depletion 
is to increase  user  cost by 44.9 percent. 
53. Prices  for PAD Districts  1, 2, 4, and 5 are  established  by application  of the relative 
price differential  in 1968 between prices in PAD District 3 and the other four PAD 
districts. 
54. Although  the depletion  allowance  did not change over the period on which our 
estimations  are based, it is possible to simulate  the effects of changes in user cost in- 
duced by tax policy because there was substantial  variation in user cost in our data 
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Table 2.  Estimates of U.S. Domestic Crude-Oil Reserves When 
Percentage Depletion and Expensing of Intangibles  Remain at 1974 
Levels, by Alternative  Prices, 1975-85 
Billions  of barrels 
Price per barrel 
Year  $8.00  $10.00  $12.00 
1975  31.5  32.1  32.5 
1976  32.4  33.5  34.3 
1977  33.3  34.8  36.1 
1978  34.1  36.0  37.7 
1979  34.8  37.2  39.3 
1980  35.4  38.3  40.8 
1981  36.1  39.3  42.1 
1982  36.6  40.3  43.4 
1983  37.1  41.1  44.6 
1984  37.6  41.9  45.7 
1985  38.0  42.7  46.8 
Sources: Simulations discussed in the text. 
Table 3.  Estimates of U.S. Domestic Crude-Oil Reserves with 
Elimination  of Percentage Depletion, by Alternative  Prices, 1975-85 
Billions  of barrels 
Price per barrel 
Year  $8.00  $10.00  $12.00 
1975  31.2  31.7  32.1 
1976  31.7  32.7  33.6 
1977  32.3  33.7  35.0 
1978  32.7  34.6  36.3 
1979  33.2  35.5  37.5 
1980  33.6  36.3  38.6 
1981  34.0  37.0  39.7 
1982  34.3  37.7  40.7 
1983  34.6  38.3  41.6 
1984  34.9  38.9  42.4 
1985  35.1  39.4  43.2 
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Table 4.  Estimates of U.S. Domestic Crude-Oil  Reserves with Elimination 
of Expensing  of Intangibles,  by Alternative  Prices, 1975-85 
Billions of barrels 
Price per barrel 
Year  $8.00  $10.00  $12.00 
1975  31.0  31.6  32.0 
1976  31.5  32.5  33.3 
1977  31.9  33.4  34.6 
1978  32.3  34.2  35.8 
1979  32.6  34.9  36.8 
1980  32.9  35.6  37.9 
1981  33.2  36.2  38.8 
1982  33.5  36.8  39.7 
1983  33.7  37.3  40.5 
1984  33.9  37.8  41.3 
1985  34.1  38.3  42.0 
Sources: Simulations discussed in the text. 
Table 5.  Estimates of U.S. Domestic Crude-Oil Reserves with 
Elimination  of Both Percentage Depletion and Expensing of Intangibles, 
by Alternative  Prices, 1975-85 
Billions of barrels 
Price per barrel 
Year  $8.00  $10.00  $12.00 
1975  30.7  31.2  31.6 
1976  30.8  31.8  32.6 
1977  30.9  32.3  33.5 
1978  31.0  32.8  34.4 
1979  31.1  33.3  35.2 
1980  31.2  33.7  35.9 
1981  31.3  34.1  36.6 
1982  31.4  34.4  37.2 
1983  31.4  34.8  37.8 
1984  31.5  35.1  38.3 
1985  31.5  35.3  38.8 
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Table 6.  Differences  in U.S. Domestic Crude-Oil Reserves under 
Alternative Levels of Tax Incentives  and of Prices, 1985 
Billions of barrels 
Price per barrel 
Assumption  about  tax incentive  $8.00  $10.00  $12.00 
(1) Maintenance  of both depletion  allowance 
and expensing  38.0  42.7  46.8 
(2) Elimination  of both incentives  31.5  35.3  38.8 
(3) Absolute difference(1)-(2)  6.5  7.4  8.0 
(4) Relative difference  (3) +  (1) (in percent)a  17.2  17.2  17.2 
Sources: Tables 2 and 5. 
a.  Percentages are calculated from unrounded data. 
and 1985.  The absolute  effect  of tax incentives  is greater  at higher  prices. 
For a summary  comparison,  Table  6 presents  the absolute  and  relative  dif- 
ferences  in 1985  reserves  for the three  assumed  price  levels  for our two ex- 
treme  cases.55  At $10.00  per  barrel,  the difference  between  maintenance  of 
the  two  most  prominent  tax  incentives  enjoyed  by the  domestic  industry  and 
their complete  elimination  is 7.4 billion barrels  of reserves  in 1985, or 
roughly  a 17  percent  reduction  in reserves.  At $12.00  per  barrel,  the differ- 
ence  is 8.0  billion  barrels  and  also 17  percent.56  If, as a very  rough  estimate, 
55. These cases are extremes  only with respect to the situations that we simulate. 
On the basis of our results,  some observers  might wish to increase  tax incentives  to the 
oil industry.  Care  must be taken  in interpreting  the simulations.  For the status-quo  case 
(Table  2), the $12 price  is 50 percent  higher  than  the $8 price.  But this does not mean  that 
1985  reserves  should  be 50 percent  larger  in the $12  column  than  in the $8 column.  In per- 
centage  terms,  the $12 price  represents  slightly  more than twice as large  an increase  over 
the 1973  real  price  as does  the $8 price.  The absolute  magnitude  of the increase  in reserves 
over  the status-quo  predicted  base  reserves  in 1974  (Table  1) is slightly  more  than  twice  as 
large  at the $12  price  as at the $8 price.  This  in turn  means  that the percentage  increase  in 
reserves  is slightly  more than twice as large as well. 
56. The MIT analysis, "Energy  Self-Sufficiency,"  found that 1980 market-clearing 
prices ranged  between $9 and $13 per barrel of crude-oil  equivalent  depending  upon 
which combination of supply and demand forecasts was used. The Erickson-Spann 
econometric  supply  forecasts  for crude oil used in the MIT analysis  were an extrapola- 
tion significantly  beyond  the range of the data upon which they were estimated  (as are 
the simulations  above), and contained  a weak implicit  assumption  that the exploration, 
development,  and production stages of the industry were fully adjusted to the new 
price  level. They did not include  the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. We are not 
here criticizing  the MIT analysis.  We ourselves  performed  the basic simulations  of the 
Erickson-Spann  model that were  an input to that analysis;  and those simulations  repre- 
sented the estimates  readily  available  at the time. The Erickson-Spann  model of crude- 476  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
we assume that annual production is 10 percent of reserves,  the elimination 
of all the incentives  would reduce oil production by between 1/2  billion and 
1 billion barrels per year in  1985 compared with its level with present 
incentives maintained. 
While tax incentives thus have a substantial effect on estimated future 
reserves in the lower forty-eight states, their importance is much reduced 
when viewed against the total U.S. energy supply. It is not improbable that 
prospective reserves on the Alaskan North  Slope are equal to the total 
reserves in the lower forty-eight states. At  current and expected prices, 
these North Slope reserves probably would be developed and produced 
even if all tax incentives were eliminated.57  Thus, the elimination of both 
percentage depletion and expensing of intangibles would make total U.S. 
crude-oil reserves in 1985 approximately 10 percent less than they would 
otherwise be.  Since crude oil represents about 33 percent of  total U.S. 
energy supply, dropping these tax incentives might make a 3 to 5 percent 
difference in the 1985 U.S. energy balance.8 
Conclusions 
Many factors have contributed to the recent stress on energy markets. 
They represent  elements in the conjuncture of the energy industries. And, 
as they impinge on the industry, they create conditions that make forecasts 
of future supply and price quite uncertain, whether based on econometric 
models or on the judgment of informed observers relying on their own 
experience. Events of the last several years indicate how sensitive energy 
balances are to changes in these conditions. Acknowledging this, we believe 
it is nonetheless useful to examine some aspects of the oil-supply situation 
that are amenable to analysis. 
Empirical tests are not consistent with the popular hypothesis that the 
oil discoveries  was then the model most amenable  to policy simulations  and sensitivity 
analyses.  But, compared  to the MIT analysis,  the results presented  above suggest that 
if self-sufficiency  is a policy goal it will have to be defined  more flexibly,  delayed  longer, 
or achieved  at higher  cost. 
57. See M. A. Adelman, Paul G. Bradley,  and Charles  A. Norman, Alaskan Oil: 
Costs  and  Supply  (Praeger,  1971). 
58. This figure  is illustrative  only. It cannot be calculated  with precision,  because of 
the problems  associated  with forecasting  total energy  demand  and the fact that elimina- 
tion of the tax subsidies  for domestic  crude  oil might  mean  also dropping  the correspond- 
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U.S. petroleum industry is ineffectually competitive at every stage. At the 
producing stage, which is particularly  relevant to the evaluation of Project 
Independence,  higher prices raise both output and rents. In the long run, 
rents are a cost to the industry. For prospective offshore activity, these 
rents will on average be captured by society in the form of lease bonuses 
and royalties, because the industry is competitive. Any attempt to limit the 
generation  of rents through price regulation is apt to impede market adjust- 
ment and create imbalances similar to those now chronic for natural gas. 
Focusing on the doubtful hypothesis that private monopoly power is the 
basic source of recent dislocations in energy markets is likely to delay and 
compound  the formulation  of energy  policy.59  But even acceptance  of the 
proposition that the U.S. petroleum industry is effectively competitive does 
not assure that efficacious policies will be formulated and implemented. In 
this regard, agriculture  is an instructive, if disheartening, example. 
Over a significant period, existing onshore supplies of oil and gas will 
continue to be a major source of domestic supplies. Eliminating the special 
tax provisions that favor the petroleum industry would reduce the rents 
that will accrue because of higher domestic prices, and also increase the 
efficiency  of resource  allocation between oil and other industries.  The draw- 
back is that such a policy change would noticeably reduce the development 
of incremental  oil supplies, particularly  for investments aimed at increasing 
the fraction of ultimate recovery of oil in place from its historic ratio of 
30 to 35 percent. Nevertheless, on balance, we believe that the special tax 
breaks should be eliminated. They impede the rational discussion of na- 
tional energy policy, result in a misallocation of resources, and in any case 
are unlikely to be the important determinants of prospective offshore and 
Alaskan supplies.60  In our view, their elimination would be worthwhile. 
59. For a discussion  of the role of OPEC  in these  events,  see James  T. Jensen,  "Inter- 
national Oil-Shortage,  Cartel or Emerging  Resource Monopoly?" Vanderbilt  Journal 
of Transnational  Law, Vol. 7 (Spring 1974), pp. 335-81. Jensen's analysis should be 
compared  to the papers  on the world oil market  in Thze  Energy  Question, Vol. 1, espe- 
cially Pts. 1, 3. 
60. We do not calculate  the social cost of this misallocation  because  we do not have 
the values for the elasticity of demand and demand-shifter  coefficients,  including our 
own, to justify such an exercise.  For a dollar  estimate  of the social costs of the 1971 tax 
subsidy  package  for the petroleum  industry,  see Spann, Erickson,  and Millsaps, "Per- 
centage  Depletion."  At higher  prices,  social costs would be larger.  Nor do we model the 
contribution  of percentage  depletion and expensing of intangibles to  self-sufficiency 
under  Project  Independence,  because  we do not have a definition  of "the capacity for 
energy  self-sufficiency."  Futhermore,  we do not know the future  role of crude oil in the 
overall  energy  balance  with other fuels. 478  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
As our estimations indicate, actual reserves  adjust slowly to their desired 
level. This means that under any feasible definition and implementation of 
a policy of energy self-sufficiency,  imported oil will have to be significant 
in U.S. energy balances for a decade or more, a period as long as, or longer 
than, the era of mandatory oil import quotas. The landed cost of foreign 
oil is apt to be subject to considerable variation during this period, making 
the development of an appropriate policy on oil imports especially impor- 
tant.61  Such a policy must be set in the context of a cohesive and consistent 
overall national energy policy that will permit substantial flexibility of 
prices in energy markets. 
61. For analysis  of a proposal  that relies on market  incentives  and private  initiative 
to attempt  to achieve  maximum  efficiency,  flexibility,  and planning  focus, see Daniel H. 
Newlon and Norman  V. Breckner,  "The Oil Security  System:  An Oil Import  Policy for 
the United States,"  Research  Contribution  255 (Institute  of Naval Studies, Center  for 
Naval Analyses,  January  1974; processed). 